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Abstract. Since the mid-1990s certification has increasingly been considered as a tool to 
increase the chance to find job particularly by youngsters. However under the 
circumstances that exist today it is known that having certificates does not automatically 
lead to get job, even contrary job seekers may remain jobless after they pay huge amounts 
of money to certfication firms. The very fast increase in the number of certfying firms 
confirms the fact that there is an ongoing demand for short term qualification courses. 
Another process which accompanies to private certification is that the loosing ground in 
public education that despite corporations still care about diplomas in hiring they reject job 
applications in the case of absence of certificates. In this study certification as a popular 
phenomenon has been compared with licensure in the context of waged engineers and their 
chambers. As a consequence of the analyses made for this study, it may be concluded that 
there is a capital accumulation which is carried out via two layers of working classes: 
masses who are obliged to be certified and waged laborers who work in certification 
industry in order to improve skills of those who are in need to be certified. During 
reviewing of literature it has also been witnessed that the academic writings focusing on the 
numbers, wages and working conditions of trainers hired by certification firms is virtually 
non exist. Therefore study suggests further researches especially on waged trainers working 
in private certification firms. 
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1. Introduction 
lthough occupational licensing as a topic in economics dates back at least 
to the comments by Adam Smith that trades conspire to reduce the 
availability of skilled craftsmen in order to raise wages (1937) the present 
system began in the final quarter of the ninetenth century (Rottenberg, 1962) 
almost in all around the world. Generally it is an institution whose effects are not 
immediately apparent, but rather reveal their efficacy over some time. Specifically, 
occupational licensing usually grandfathers in practitioners, implements new 
exams, and develops educational and location-specific requirements so that 
implementing these policies usually takes many years. Consequently, the labor 
market or consumer outcomes are not immediately apparent—a longer-run 
perspective is required to fully understand the wage, price, quality, and 
distributional effects. An approach that evaluates the various stages of occupational 
regulation can help capture and illuminate the role that licensing has in labor and 
service markets. Occupations are rarely formed as licensed ones. Occupations 
evolve, organize, and often select licensing as a method to obtain professionalism, 
quality, and status, as well as to limit the supply of practitioners (Kleiner, 2013). 
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For the purpose of this study, on the other, it is necessarry to contrast 
occupational licensing with certifications. A certification permits any person to 
perform the relevant tasks, but the government agency administers examinations 
and certifies those who have passed and the level of skill or knowledge. Consumers 
of the product or service can then choose whether to hire a certified worker or not. 
In the case of occupational licensing, it is illegal for anyone without a license to 
perform the task. For example travel agents and mechanics are generally certified, 
but not licensed (Kleiner, 2000). In the economic literature “licensure” refers to 
regulations that prohibit workers who do not meet specific criteria, such as passing 
an exam and/or completing an approved course of study, from legally working. In 
contrast, “certification” refers to the situation where workers who meet certain 
criteria are given a designation of being certified, but non-certified individuals are 
also allowed to offer their services in the market. The least restrictive form of 
occupational regulation is registration, whereby individuals file information on 
their qualifications, but there are no specific requirements for professional standing 
or limitations on who may practice (Sass, 2014:3).  According to Bullock and 
Trombley (1999) professionalization is characterized as, “when a profession arises 
when any trade or occupation transforms itself through the development of formal 
qualification based upon education, apprenticeship, and examinations, the 
emergence of regulatory bodies with powers to admit and discipline members, and 
some degree of monopoly rights” (National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education, 
2012).    
The characteristics which differ a profession from other occupations are that the 
right to control one’s own work, rendering ‘outside’ evaluation illegitimate and 
intolerable (Freidson, 1970); the mechanisms for controlling the market for 
expertise via guild like associations (Krause, 1996); and the collective process of 
upward social mobility by claiming higher social status, including the use of the 
legitimizing force of universities that certify professional competence (Sako, 
2013). 
The point of departure of this study is that the increased pressures on Turkish 
occupational chambers, especially TMMOB- Union of Chambers of Turkish 
Engineers and Architects and its affiliates to act as private testing & certification 
firms in the market. Therefore study specifically focuses on newly emerged private 
certification firms which have been offered as an opportunity of finding job for 
technical staffs while they have been undermining the gained rights and privilages 
of those professionals. Regarding with the relation between certification and 
licensure it must be noted that the majority of technical staffs are the members of 
licensing organizations, namely, occupational chambers. Therefore study first gives 
a brief literature on the different thesis and perspectives related to both licensure 
and certification. Since there is no any critical writing in Turkey and only few exist 
in Europe on this topic, the section on literature maninly relies on U.S. cases. The 
next section is devoted to the relationships between commercialization in 
educational services and newly developed certification industry. The 
internationalization of productive capital, legitimacy and illegitimacy of 
certification, different forms of joining of certification firms into the chain of 
capital accumulation and beneficiaries’ criticisms against certification are the 
sections follow. Then study ends with the sections on Turkey and conclusion. 
             
2. Different thesis on Licensure and Certification 
The Governmental licensing is often confused with private credentialing, 
generally referred to as certification, because the meanings of the terms are 
frequently interchanged. Although some jurisdictions use the term certification as 
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signifying governmental authority to practice a profession, the difference between 
licensure and certification is essentially the difference between governmental 
regulation and self-regulation of a profession. Certification is the process by which 
private organizations recognize individuals for meeting certain criteria established 
by the private organization in which individuals are recognized for advanced 
knowledge and skills. It is a form of self-regulation which is voluntary in that it is 
not required of individuals prior to practice and is without governmental oversight. 
Practitioners seek certification usually as a form of self promotion and in an 
attempt to distinguish one practitioner from another. There is no a legal 
requirement to be certified and no governmental penalties for failure to achieve or 
loss of certification recognition. Like licensure, certification is usually granted for a 
limited period of time and must be renewed based upon criteria set by the private 
entity. Certification does not provide a legal mechanism to practice an otherwise 
governmentally regulated profession, but does provide certificate holders to 
accurately promote the fact that they are certified by the private entity (FSMTB, 
2014). Although there is no any legal requirement to be certified we must accept 
the fact that there is a systemic necessity for jobless laborers to be certified because 
the firms in the market are increasingly demanding certified labourers. When 
jobless masses observe that they can not get job because of the lack of necessarry 
certifications they soon tend to apply certification firms. 
There is a quite vast literature on licensure in general. Friedman (1962) among 
others claimed that the ultimate goal of neoliberalism is to convert licensure 
systems into private certifying. This development is well underway in the form of 
publicly-supported vouchers for private school tuition, highstakes, standardized 
testing, accredited and non-accredited private training&testing firms and 
outsourcing of further training for those who have been licensed before. The most 
prominent aspects of ongoing debate are related with protection of public interest, 
free competition, quality assurance and wage and employment affects. The public 
policy and legal communities, however, have noted that regulating occupations in 
order to protect the public against incompetent, untrustworthy, or irresponsible 
practitioners is in the public interest (Thomas v. Collins, 1945 cited by Kleiner and 
Krueger, 2011).  
A second view concedes that occupational licensing increases the wages of 
professionals, but argues that licensing serves as a means of solving the problem of 
asymmetric information. According to this view consumers have less information 
than practitioners, and licensing protects consumers from poor service (Leland, 
1979; Shapiro, 1986 cited by Carpenter, 2012). For Kleiner and Krueger, on the 
other, specific requirements by the government to enter an occupation, such as 
education level and long internships, are positively associated also with wages. 
This pattern of results is consistent with a monopoly model of occupational 
licensing; where supply is more restricted if the licensing authority operates on a 
wider geographic level. A simple theory of occupational licensing suggests that 
administrative procedures regulate the supply of labor in the market (2011). 
Similarly also Milton Friedman defines licensure as a special case of a much more 
general and exceedingly widespread phenomenon which edicts that individuals 
may not engage in particular economic activities except under conditions laid down 
by a constituted authority of the state.  
“A widespread notion about the caste system is that every person's 
occupation is completely determined by the caste into which he is born. It is 
obvious to an economist that this is an impossible system, since it prescribes 
a rigid distribution of persons among occupations determined entirely by 
birthrates and not at all by conditions of demand. Of course, this is not the 
way the system worked. What was true, and to some measure still is, was that 
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a limited number of occupations were reserved to members of certain castes, 
but not every member of those castes followed those occupations. There were 
some general occupations, such as general agricultural work, which members 
of various castes might engage in. These permitted an adjustment of the 
supply of people in different occupations to the demand for their services” 
(Friedman, 1962:138-139). 
Contrary what Fiedman argues, the sociologist Emile Durkheim emphasizes the 
importance of professional associations in providing their members with moral 
rules that professional associations would potentially be able to fill in an ethics gap 
left open by the disorderly, violent, and confused market system (Persico, 2011). 
Especially when public interest is considered the points such as moral values raised 
by Durkheim seem that they have to be taken into account. Nancy Chornic 
exemplifies public interest dimension of licensure via U.S. nursing services by 
stating that licensure results from the enactment of a nurse practice act by state 
legislatures to regulate nursing: 
“Laws governing individual healthcare providers are enacted through state 
legislatures. After enacting a nurse practice act, a state legislature delegates 
authority to a state agency, such as a board of nursing, to enforce it. The state 
agency is authorized to promulgate regulations to implement the nurse 
practice act for the purpose of protecting the public health and safety. The 
nursing license is the end product of this process. Because the primary 
purpose of licensure is public protection and safety, the major stakeholder for 
licensure is the public” (Chornic, 2008).  
  Wage and employment affects of licensure can be followed through U.S. 
example that in 1950s and early 1960s, less than 10 percent of the workforce 
required an occupational license to work for pay. However, by 2008, estimates 
from the Princeton Data Improvement Initiative show that about 29 percent of the 
workforce required a license from local, state, or federal government to work for 
pay (Kleiner, 2013). Similarly also in Turkey membership figures of Professional 
chambers radically changed since 1950s.2 Since not only government projects but 
also private sector have to employ licensed professionals any increase in the 
number of occupational licenses corresponds with the increases in actual wage 
payments, namely, the overall costs of workforce which is something intolerable 
for capital accumulation.  
There are two opposing views for the prevalence of licensure. In the “public 
interest” approach, licensing is viewed as a mechanism for ensuring quality when 
consumers are poorly informed. The public interest approach implies that 
professional licensure would be most likely to occur where the cost to consumers 
of obtaining information is high and the loss from consuming low quality services 
is great. Consumers who value improvements in service quality highly will benefit 
from licensure, while consumers who prefer lower quality (at a lower price) could 
be made worse off (Shapiro, 1986). In contrast, the “capture” theory of regulation 
posits that professionals will seek out licensure as a means of restricting entry into 
a profession, thereby raising wages (Stigler, 1971, Peltzman,1976 cited by Sass, 
2014). 
Friedman, on the other, points out (1962) the fact that certification without 
licensure is a half-way house that maintains a good deal of protection against 
monopolization. Author underlines that certification may also have disadvantages, 
but it is worth noting that the usual arguments for licensure, and in particular the 
paternalistic arguments, are satisfied almost entirely by certification alone: “If the 
2  While the number of TMMOB members was only 8 thousands in 1955, this figure 
rocketed to 381 thousands in 2000 (TMMOB, 2003: 73-75)  
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argument is that we are too ignorant to judge good practitioners, all that is needed 
is to make the relevant information available. If, in full knowledge, we still want to 
go to someone who is not certified, that is our business; we cannot complain that 
we did not have the information. In the first place, licensure the key to the control 
that the medical profession can exercise over the number of physicians. To 
understand why this is so requires some discussion of the structure of the medical 
profession”. Friedman continues as follows: 
“The American Medical Association is perhaps the strongest trade union in 
the United States. The essence of the power of a trade union is its power to 
restrict the number who may engage in a particular occupation. This 
restriction may be exercised indirectly by being able to enforce a wage rate 
higher than would otherwise prevail. If such a wage rate can enforced, it will 
reduce the number of people who can get jobs and thus indirectly the number 
of people pursuing the occupation. This technique of restriction has 
disadvantages. There is always a dissatisfied fringe of people who are trying 
to get into the occupation. A trade union is much better off if it can limit 
directly the number of people who enter the occupation -- who ever try to get 
jobs in it. The disgruntled and dissatisfied are excluded at the outset, and the 
union does not have to worry about them. The American Medical Association 
is in this position. It is a trade union that can limit the number of people who 
can enter.” (Friedman, 1962:148).   
Not only Milton Friedman but also Kleiner makes a similar comparison by 
claiming that one major difference between occupational licensing and unions was 
that licensing may be a more secure job classification. It is rare either for an 
occupation to become deregulated by a government agency, or for the regulatory 
Powers of a licensing board to be stripped by the legislature, or for the licensing 
board to ask to be determinated (Kleiner, 2000). Unlike unions, which can engage 
in concerted activities such as strikes or work slowdowns, however, licensed 
workers do not sign collective agreements with their employers. Nor do they 
engage in strikes against employers to raise wages (Kleiner & Krueger, 2011). 
More importantly occupational chambers are not class based organizations that 
each them may have members from both classes. When we consider engineers’ 
chambers, for instance, there may be both employer engineers and waged engineers 
who are members in the same occupational chamber.  
Kleiner and Krueger point out that occupational licensing can affect pay and 
employment through three main channels. First, licensing may increase quality by 
imposing initial education, testing, continuing training requirements, internship 
requirements, or fees. These requirements are likely to diminish the number of less 
qualified or unmotivated individuals who could enter the occupation, and thereby 
serve to drive up the average quality of workers in an occupation. A consequence is 
higher quality outcomes for those who are able to obtain the service, but fewer 
practitioners and less access to the service (2011). Exactly for this reason we may 
well argue that there are quite strong connections between certification and 
accreditation in higher education or Bologna process. Again for this reason newly 
emerging certification industry strongly objects licensure.  
Regarding the thesis on quality assurance, it must be noted that skills are of 
inherent value to people who possess them, but much of the public policy debate 
over the decades has focused on their contribution to job creation and the 
international competitiveness of nations. In the twentyfirst century, this debate 
touches a wider portfolio of skills than in the past as global value chains spread 
from manufacturing to a variety of professional services. The phenomenon of 
offshoring has givenrise to studies on the global mobility of jobs, resulting in a 
finding that more educated workers hold somewhat more offshoreable jobs 
(Blinder, 2009; Blinder & Krueger, 2009).That is, higher levels of education and 
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professional skill attainment are no longer an insurance against job losses caused 
by international competition from lower cost locations. But, again it must be noted 
that offshoring in services particularly in Professional services is a relatively recent 
phenomenon dating from the 1990s. Trading at a distance requires routinization 
and standardization of tasks in manufacturing technology –that testing and 
certifying became the two preconditions of this process- was applied to this end 
first before offshoring became prevalent (Gereffi, Humphrey & Sturgeon, 2005; 
Sturgeon, 2002, Thun, 2010 cited by Sako, 2013).   
Bizarre as the US regulations might seem, it is only one of dozens of such 
requirements, generally called “certificate of necessity” (CON) laws, that exist 
across the country, governing a variety of industries, from moving companies and 
taxicabs to hospitals and car lots. A legacy of the early 20th century, CON laws 
restrict economic opportunity and raise costs for products and services that 
consumers need. Unlike traditional occupational licensing rules, they are not 
intended to protect the public by requiring business owners to demonstrate 
professional expertise or education. Instead, these laws are explicitly designed to 
restrict competition and boost the prices that established companies can charge. 
Occupational licensing laws are among the most common abridgements of 
economic liberty, but CON rules are more pernicious. They do not even pretend to 
protect public safety by ensuring that practitioners are educated or skilled; they 
exist for the explicit purpose of preventing competition (Sandefur, 2011). Arrow 
also says (1971) that the existence of licenses may minimize consumer uncertainity 
over the quality of the licensed service and increase the overall demand for the 
service. Moreover it is argued that in some cases, a poor quality service is not just a 
matter between employer and employee a doctor who makes a bad diagnosis may 
cause a widespread epidemic. In this sense requiring a practitioner to be trained at a 
minimum level recognized a form of regulation which may produce positive social 
payoffs (Rottenberg, 1962).  
Skeptics of occupational licensing point out that the empirical evidence on the 
increase in quality, greater level of training, or avoidance of catastrophes is often 
thin or nonexistent in licensure. They argue that if a signal of quality is important, 
certification is a better way of accomplishing the goal than occupational licensing. 
Moreover, the skeptics also argue that any remaining beneficial effects of 
occupational licensing are more than offset by the monopoly effects of restriction 
of supply of practitioners. The most generally held view on the economics of 
occupational licensing is that it restricts the supply of labor to the occupation and 
thereby drives up the price of labour as well as of services rendered (Rottenberg, 
1962). State regulated occupations can use political institutions such as state 
legislatures or city councils to control initial entry and in-migration, and thereby 
restrict supply and raise the wages of the licensed practitioner (Kleiner, 2000). 
Unlike federal state, and county governments who accept the argument that 
occupational licensing protects consumers and improves their welfare, the 
dominant position in U.S. economics is that licensing restricts supply, increases 
prices, and transfers wealth from consumers to producers. In the 20th century, 
Friedman and Kuznets (1945), Friedman (1962), and Kleiner (2006), among many 
others, reiterated and expanded the argument that licensing is monopolistic and is 
intended to secure rents to practitioners. Law and Kim (2005) discuss the historical 
development of licensing laws during the Progressive Era and examine what they 
consider the dominant view among economists that licensing restricts entry and 
reduces competition. They argue informational asymmetries, which were 
exacerbated due to increasing urbanization and advances in knowledge, explain the 
enactment of many of these laws and provide justification for them on economic 
grounds (Skarbek, 2008). Also for Stigler (1971), an apparent rent seeking exists in 
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licencing processes that in return for gains from state-created barriers to entry, 
coalitions built along occupational lines support politicians. Author argues that 
government action in times of crisis is often inconsistent with its rhetoric so that 
licensing is typically justified on the grounds that market mechanisms will not 
mitigate the problems associated with asymmetric information (Skarbek, 2008).  
Workers in licensed occupations make up a large and growing proportion of the 
U.S. workforce, with nearly three out of ten U.S. workers being required to hold a 
license in order to do their job (Kleiner & Krueger, 2010). Just like what happened 
in the rest of world in the last few decades also in the United States employment 
shifted from manufacturing to service industries, which typically have lower union 
representation. Thus the members of the occupations established a formal set of 
standards to govern the members of occupation. For a professional association, 
obtaining licensing legislation meant raising funds from members to lobby the state 
legislature, particularly the chairs of appropriate committees. The large potential 
gain from regulation through increased demand for the service, enhanced earnings, 
and the ability to restrict supply outweighs the potential losses to consumers of 
potentially higher prices for the regulated services (Kleiner & Krueger, 2011). 
 
3. Discrediting of Schooling Systems and Loosing Ground 
in Public Education 
As long as licensing relates to meet specific criteria, such as passing an exam 
and/or completing an approved course of study or more generally to get a diploma, 
any work which focuses specifically on licensure must also cover education in 
general and higher education in particular. Business groups have recently turned 
their attention to “work-ready testing” in an attempt to sort future labor. Academic 
diplomas or grades mean little to employers any more especially when making 
hiring decisions, instead relying upon school-based formal assessments to evaluate 
future workers on both basic literacy skills and work habits. This technocratic 
approach sits well with policy reformers intent on implementing tests for 
employability (Lakes, 2011).  
Although work-ready testing is a young practice and limited only with the 
U.S.A for now it appears as a quite promising experience for employers especially 
to grow up a well behaved workforce. Even it may be more explanatory to change 
its name as workforce-ready-to-obey.  Indeed in the U.S.A some employers say 
that they are not only dissatisfied with the basic academic and technical skills of 
job seekers but also find that applicants and new hires lack the more general habits 
and competencies that characterize effective employees. Survey data and other 
research also show that employers believe that recent high school graduates often 
lack skills such as punctuality, communication, problem solving, and willingness to 
accept supervision – in addition to appropriate levels of literacy and numeracy -- 
that are recognized as critical both to an effective workplace and to an individual’s 
successful entry into the world of work. In the early 1990s, the Secretary's 
Commission on Achieving Necessary Skills (SCANS) and the subsequent National 
Skills Standards Board (created by the 1994 National Skills Standards Act) led the 
way in defining and acquiring the skills needed to succeed in the workplace 
(Muller & Beatty, 2008). 
Following to the complaints on insufficiences in formal higher education from 
business world commodification in higher education services was legitimized and 
pumped not only by global institutions like WTO but also by important 
international institutions and regional Blocks as well. In an OECD survey, for 
instance, four possible models are suggested as they can contribute to transnational 
regulation of trade in higher education services. The first model departs from the 
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existing national quality assurance and accreditation systems and agencies and tries 
to strengthen them in view of the international challenges generated by the 
expansion of transnational education and trade in higher education services. This is 
the dominant model today and a high number of developments can be situated in it. 
It is therefore also the most extensively reviewed model. The second model 
upgrades networking and exchange towards real collaboration, for example in joint 
cross-border quality assessment projects, and formal or informal mutual 
recognition agreements between agencies and countries, often following 
agreements on the recognition of qualifications or mobility and credit-transfer 
programmes. The third model aims at the development of validation or meta-
accreditation of quality assurance systems and agencies, based upon a conceptual 
framework and a set of methodological standards for trustworthy quality 
assessment. The meta-evaluation could result in a formal recognition or eventually 
a ‘certification’ of the agency and, eventually, in the formal international 
acceptance of the quality assurance or accreditation activities carried out by that 
agency. Finally, the fourth model concerns the development of real international 
quality assurance and accreditation arrangements. We can say that today the first 
model surely is the dominant one, but there are also developments and experiments 
going on in the other models (Van Damme, 2002).  
Since the creation of the first agencies in the eighties, quality assurance has 
become a central objective of governmental policies and an important steering 
mechanism in higher education systems worldwide. Undoubtedly, quality has been 
the central concept and the major focus of institutions and governments in the field 
of higher education in the nineties. Many countries now have established national 
quality assurance arrangements or are in a process of doing so. The most important 
dimensions of variation between national quality assurance and accreditation refer 
to (1) the definition of the concept of quality itself, (2) the purpose and functions of 
quality assurance, i.e. the balance between internal functions (improvement) and 
external functions (evaluation, accountability and transparency, steering and 
funding, accreditation and recognition), and (3) the methodologies used in quality 
assurance and accreditation(Van Damme, 2002). Just like above mentioned 
purposes and functions of quality assurance, Giuliano Augusti also rightly 
underlines that QA (quality assurance) often tends to assess more the “process” 
than the “contents” of the education: therefore, especially in subjects that lead 
towards a “profession” (“engineering” first among them), the practice of 
“accreditation” is also increasing throughout the World (Augusti, 2012). With the 
fear and uncertainty of continuous employment in times of job scarcity, neoliberals 
essentially police the working classes through a variety of disciplinary techniques. 
Quality working life under neoliberalism has become more conditional, temporary 
and uncertain, with valued good-paying jobs reserved only for those who have 
managed their biographies appropriately. What has resulted in post-Keynesian 
times is a shift from the systemic notion of full employment into the neoliberal 
model of contingent or casual work, meaning the focus is upon individuals to self-
manage their lives for futures of mobile and uneven employment (Lakes, 2011).  
Whereas higher education was previously attached a national and cultural role, 
the economic rationale became more and more important in Europe as well in due 
course. The 1991 European Memorandum on Higher Education showed that the 
economic rationale had become part of the Community’s broader agenda of 
economic and social coherence. Although at that time many national and 
institutional representatives criticised this rationale, soon afterwards, national 
governments started to stress the economic role of higher education. The general 
argument was that autonomous higher education institutions would be able to 
better cope with and adjust to the requirements of international, national and 
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regional economic environments. Whereas the latter concerned the general 
government’s steering philosophy, it also became clear in the particular policies on 
internationalisation (Huisman & Van Der Wende, 2004). 
Similarly the Bologna Process (1999) outlined its rationale for the Bologna 
Framework as to provide a mechanism to relate national frameworks to each other 
so as to enable:  
(a) International transparency – this is at the heart of the Bologna process and 
while devices, such as the Diploma Supplement, have a role to play in this 
objective, it is difficult to ensure that qualifications can be easily read and 
compared across borders without a simplifying architecture for mutual 
understanding.  
(b) International recognition of qualifications – this will be assisted through a 
framework, which provides a common understanding of the outcomes represented 
by qualifications for the purposes of employment and access to continuing 
education.  
(c) International mobility of learners and graduates – this depends on the 
recognition of their prior learning and qualifications gained. Learners can 
ultimately have greater confidence that the outcomes of study abroad will 
contribute to the qualification sought in their home country. A framework will also 
be of particular help in supporting the development and recognition of joint degrees 
from more than one country (www.ehea.info, 2008). 
For U.S. experience on trade in higher education John Bellamy Foster’s article 
provides a wider perspective through private foundations exist in educational 
services. In Foster’s article it is underlined that the Broad Foundation promotes 
what Naomi Klein has called “the shock doctrine,” or a form of “disaster 
capitalism,” destroying the public education system in order to open it up for 
privatization. In April 2009, Seattle Education posted a guide to parents, “How to 
Tell if Your School is Infected by the Broad Virus,” on its Web site. Among the 
symptoms of the “Broad virus” listed were: 
“Schools in your district are suddenly closed….Repetition of the phrases “the 
achievement gap” and “closing the achievement gap” in district documents 
and public statements….Sudden increase in the number of paid outside 
consultants. Increase in the number of public schools turned into privately-
run charters….Weak math text adopted….Possibly weak language arts 
too….The district leadership declares that the single most significant problem 
in the district is suddenly teachers!…Excessive amounts of testing introduced 
and imposed on your kids….Your school board starts to show signs of the 
Stockholm Syndrome. They vote in lockstep with the 
superintendent….Grants appear from the Broad and Gates foundations in 
support of the superintendent, and his/her “Strategic Plan.” The Gates 
Foundation gives your district grants for technical things… and/or teacher 
“effectiveness” or studies on charter schools” (Foster, 2011:44).  
In recent years, another one, the Gates Foundation, by far the largest of these 
foundations, has adopted an agenda very close to that of the Broad Foundation, and 
the two often operate jointly. Bill Gates has declared that there is no connection 
between teacher quality and such factors as certification, experience, and advanced 
degrees, or even extensive knowledge of the subject matter. The Gates Foundation 
has poured hundreds of millions of dollars into the support of educational advocacy 
groups meant to pressure public policy, all aimed at restructuring public education, 
promoting charter schools, encouraging privatization, and breaking teachers’ 
unions. Thus, it has given millions of dollars to Teachers Plus, an organization that 
supports the restructuring of education, while arguing that the layoffs of teachers 
should be on the basis of assessments (test scores), rather than seniority rules, as 
the unions insist. The Gates Foundation also supports Teach for America, a 
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program that recruits applicants straight out of college, puts them through a five-
week boot camp, and sends them off to teach in low-income schools, usually for 
two or three years—without the benefit of teacher education, or a meaningful 
apprenticeship leading to professional certification  (Foster,  2011). 
It is evident from these examples that the main idea behind short-term, private 
certification in addition to licensure is a kind of perception management to 
convince public opinion that university education is incapable to catch the speed of 
technological development. Although it is true that technological changes do not 
necessarily depend on physical deterioration of the means of production no longer, 
nevertheless there must also be public ways especially via public universities to fill 
technological shortcomings of technical staffs after their graduation.  
 
4. Internationalization of Productive Capital and Its 
Relation with Private Certifying  
Simon states (1951) that in many cases offshoring is a trigger to routinize tasks 
in Professional jobs in Professional services, offshoring is equivalent to turning an 
employment contract into a sales contracts. This contractual shift to an extent 
necessitates codifying things that had been implicit prior to the shift. Offshoring or 
internationalization of productive capital is the migration of productive economic 
activity and the associated employment from a home country –normally a 
developed nation such as the U.S. –  to low cost countries such as India and China. 
In its 2011 World Investment Report, UNCTAD (2011:137) estimated that services 
outsourcing exports were in the range of $ 90-100 billion in 2009, although the 
figure could be as high as $380 billion if intra-firm trading was taken into account 
(Sako, 2013).  
The offshoring research network survey of 253 US companies at Duke 
University also reveals that by 2006 the most common type of functional category 
offshored by US firms was IT services followed by product development and 
administrative services (Lewin, Massini, Peeters, 2009). Using global value chain 
framework Gary Gereffi and his colleagues have examined (2010)  specific 
mechanisms for local firms to climb up the value chain in services requiring higher 
levels of skills. Starting with low value aded activities such as back office 
transactions and call senters, offshoring has expanded to include knowledge work 
in software programming, engineering design, R&D, radiology, accounting, human 
resources, financial modelling and analytics, market research and legal support 
services. Thus, it must be noted here that jobs requiring higher skills are not 
necessarily more secure than those with lower skill content (Sako, 2013). 
 Internationalization of productive capital following the crisis in 1970s had also 
visible impacts on the agenda of global trade. Inclusion of educational services into 
global trade agenda through GATS (1995) is only one of numerous agreements 
signed under GATT/WTO. However trade in educational services also appeared as 
a sector for which WTO members were the least inclined to commit themselves to 
further liberalisation since then. Regarding trade via adult education and 
certification processes three components seem to be essential for member states: 
the international registration of providers, the development of new arrangements 
for the recognition of foreign qualifications and for the transferability of credits, 
and the development of an international approach to quality assurance and 
accreditation. Especially quality assurance and accreditation are mentioned in 
many publications as the crucial elements of regulation in a more and more trade 
oriented international higher education market. Not surprisingly many experts 
believe that trade liberalisation is unavoidable and perhaps also beneficial in the 
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long run, but that the resulting liberalised global higher education market will need 
strong quality assurance arrangements (Van Damme, 2002).  
 Regional free trade agreements and other type of international economic 
cooperation and integration seem to shape environments for the development of 
cooperation between member states in the field of quality assurance and 
accreditation in higher education. A clear case of this is the development of quality 
assurance and accreditation in Mexico under the impact of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The certification of Professional qualifications 
and the free mobility of professions within the NAFTA has stimulated the 
cooperation between US and Mexican accreditation agencies and the establishment 
of Mexican agencies to the example of their US counterparts (Van Damme, 
2002:13-14). There is now a clear tendency towards mutual and multilateral 
recognition agreements to solve issues of professional recognition and equivalency 
of standards and procedures. Free trade agreements have stimulated this 
development powerfully: EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, APEC, MERCOSUR, etc. all 
have regulations dealing with professional services leading to professional 
recognition (Van Damme, 2002). 
When we interpret above given institutions and agreements and also the targets 
of the Bologna Framework mentioned in previous section in terms of accumulation 
of capital we see that the main purpose is to harmonize different qualifications in 
member states. The reason behind this purpose is to enable investors to employ 
engineers, staffs and technical staffs abroad whose labour power are cheaper but 
equipped with the same qualifications of the European workforce, a tendency 
which potantially reduce the value of Europen labour power by increasing 
unemployment in Europe. At the same time this is what should be expected 
following internationalization of productive capital as an answer to crisis in 1970s. 
The emphasizes on international mobility of learners or Diploma Supplements 
underlined in Bologna Framework are also important both for analysing 
commercialization exists in higher education systems in Europe and for 
understanding the structural relation between coomercialization in higher education 
and private certification. 
 
5. Legitimacy and Illegitimacy of Certification 
Friedman claims that there are private certification agencies in many areas that 
certify the competence of a person or the quality of a particular product. The Good 
Housekeeping seal is a private certification arrangement. For industrial products 
there are private testing laboratories that will certify to the quality of a particular 
product. For consumer products, there are consumer testing agencies of which 
Consumer's Union and Consumer's Research are the best known in the United 
States. Better Business Bureaus are voluntary organizations that certify the quality 
of particular dealers. Technical schools, colleges, and universities certify the 
quality of their graduates. One function of retailers and department stores is to 
certify the quality of the many items they sell. The consumer develops confidence 
in the store, and the store in turn has an incentive to earn this confidence by 
investigating the quality of the items it sells. One can however argue that in some 
cases, or perhaps even in many, voluntary certification will not be carried as far as 
individuals would be willing to pay for carrying it because of the difficulty of 
keeping the certification confidential. The issue is essentially the one involved in 
patents and copyrights, namely, whether individuals are in a position to capture the 
value of the services that they render to others (Friedman, 1962).  
Distinctively from patents and copyrights, testing and certification firms change 
the content and requirements of the courses they organized very often. Also the 
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vendor-centric nature of certification processes gives rise to the changes in 
curriculums according to the different expectations of each vendor who are 
composed by industrial capitalists relying upon testing and certification firms. 
Wyrostek who is an IT expert very well experienced in testing and certification 
sector also touches on (2008) the problem is that every vendor has its own set of 
certification criteria; none of them match, and there is no uniformity. The IT expert 
states that whatever Vendor A says you should know is what you need to know in 
order to achieve validation:  
“If you have ever taken a Novell exam, a Microsoft exam, a Cisco exam, 
and/or a CompTIA exam, you probably have been told to answer the 
questions on the exam the way the given vendor wants you to answer the 
questions. Because IT certifications are vendor-centric, a vendor can revise, 
revamp, or completely redo a certification as often as it wants. Much is based 
on the life cycle of a given product, such as an operating system. If you want 
to feel like you are simply chasing your tail, keep up your certifications based 
on a vendor’s whim and whimsy for how long they feel a product’s life cycle 
is. Here’s a good example from my experience. In 1995–1996, I earned the 
Microsoft MCSE for NT 3.51 through a lot of hard work. Not six months 
later, however, Microsoft changed the MCSE requirements for the MCSE in 
NT 4.0. The seven exams I took for 3.51 no longer had legs. I had to take six 
or seven more. So I did. Well, guess what happened in 1999–2000? Windows 
2000 came out, along with a whole new series of exams—which almost 
killed me. Now in less than 4 years I had taken close to 21 exams to earn 3 
Microsoft certifications that I needed to teach the most up-to-date Microsoft 
classes. Several years later, Windows 2003 came out with two more upgrade 
exams, which so far I have not taken/passed because of disgust with the 
process. I will probably have to take them before long because the Longhorn 
roadmap "encourages" MCSEs to be at least 2003 to avoid taking all exams 
again. I would agree until recently, when I was talking to an HR recruiter 
who told me that a company that was interested in me would not consider any 
of my experience unless I had the latest-and-greatest MCSE. Three earlier 
MCSEs and 15 years of field experience made no difference. If I did not have 
the MCSE 2003 they would look elsewhere. Indeed, they looked elsewhere.”  
(Wyrostek, 2008) 
Moreover Friedman implies that since private certification agencies already 
exist in many areas for decades there should not be any objection to transfer the 
tasks of testing and training given to technical staffs to private entities. It must be 
noted that the difference between certification examples given by Friedman dated 
1962 and today’s practices can best be seen by comparing the institutions who have 
been certifying staffs. As it is also stated by Friedman most of certifying 
institutions in 1960s, 1970s even in 1980s were non-profit, publicly run 
organizations and a market specialized on certification did not exist. However 
today there are thousands of private firms who are accumulating capital through 
certification market. Apart from this, unlike 1960s and 1970s, certified staffs are 
paying the costs of private courses by their own. Also because certification 
processes are offered as a job opportunity for future, the tution fees paid by both 
jobless or hired employees to private courses represent the reductions from actual 
or future wages of receivers. As it is perfectly described by Wyrostek above much 
certification programmes are based on the life cycle of a given product, that a staff 
has to have tens of exams in order to get few certificates to meet continously 
changing technological criteria.     
At the same time, the most valid reason for certificate receivers for not to render 
what did they learn in these courses to others is the process itself that vendor firms 
accept to employ only those who deserve to get certificates which have to be drawn 
up in service receiver’ name. Or, in another word, industrialists and certification 
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firms work collaboratively together that while former has been forming a market 
for this specific service by demanding only staffs with certificates, the latter 
encounter with no trouble to sell its commodities, namely the qualifications added 
to service receivers. Thus it seems that the above cited problem pointed out by 
Friedman had already been overcome.         
 
6. How Certification Firms Join into the Chain of Capital 
Accumulation ? 
Many of the activities involved in the certification process can be either 
conducted by the certifier or delegated to other parties, such as independent testing 
and calibration laboratories or external auditors. Certification often results in the 
granting of a mark, certificate, label, or registration, such as ISO 9000 or ISO 
14000, with a quality system registar. The certification market usually involves a 
number of competing private bodies. In the vast majority of countries, subsidiaries 
of the 20 or so largest global certification bodies have an important share of the 
market. While most certification bodies operate as private for-profit companies, 
others operate as individual not-for-profit organizations or as part of industry 
associations. (Guasch, et al., 2007: 65). 
Regarding the main focus of this paper O’Grady notes that there is a modest, 
but noteworthy, overlap between the system of licensure for professional engineers 
and the system of certification of technologists and technicians by sharing the 
results filtered from his research made in the U.S. The survey data suggest that 
there is a number of persons who are working as engineers, but whose professional 
certification is as a technologist or technician. This is consistent with Census data. 
Barely half of certified technicians report that they are working as technicians. 
Employer policy is also an important factor in both licensure and certification. A 
large majority of engineering and technology employers have policies that support 
the systems of professional licensure and professional certification, though many of 
these employers do not provide financial support for annual licensure or 
certification fees. Employer support for licensure of engineers is stronger than 
support for certification of technologists and technicians. Licensed engineers 
strongly associate their licence with professionalism, client expectations, better 
career options, increased employability, and increased earnings. Persons who are 
working as engineers, but who are not licensed, largely share these perceptions, 
although a significant number attach less importance to client expectations. Among 
technologists and technicians, there is a similar association of certification with 
professionalism, client expectations, better career options, increased employability, 
and increased earnings (O’Grady, 2009).  
In modern business, IT certification in general and Microsoft certification in 
particular has been an important phenomenon for all parties involved since 1990s. 
As skill validation, it is widely claimed that certification “ensures that businesses 
are able to identify experts who know how to use those powerful tools and 
solutions to the best of their advantage” (Vakhitova & Bollinger, 2011). Among 
these kind of arguments we see strong references to staffs and workers about that 
they would also benefit from certification process. For instance Vakhitova and 
Bollinger state that for the workers, certification is not only associated with a 
higher human capital but also can provide signals about leadership qualities and 
comprehension of innovative information (Vakhitova & Bollinger, 2011). It is also 
a several billion dollar a year business. According to a study conducted by 
International Data Corporation, the IT training and testing industries reached $2.5 
billion in 1999 (IDC, 2000). Though not formally required in the IT sector, 
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certification may result in brand loyalty or provide additional market power for the 
certifying company (Vakhitova & Bollinger, 2011).  
In the U.S. the Microsoft Certified Professional Program was established in 
1992. In the year 2000, Fairfield Research, Inc. and Certification Magazine 
recognized Microsoft as the industry leader whose certification programs attracted 
the largest number of certificates. According to www.microsoft.com, as of January 
2004 about 1.5 million individuals had achieved Microsoft certification worldwide, 
and about one third of them obtained more than one certificate (Vakhitova & 
Bollinger, 2011). Transnational corporations already are advantaged by the 
multibillion-dollar worldwide markets in schooling, as seen in the testing and 
textbook publishing industries, among instructional technology vendors, and in the 
food preparation and cleaning services, to name a few. Spring (1993) noted that the 
testing industry is driven by the profit motive, in the hands of a few major firms, 
and always on the watch for new ways to increase their markets. Houghton Mifflin 
foresaw a market potential of $1.6 billion in delivering their tests electronically, 
and for $16 million acquired computer adaptive technologies of Evanston, Illinois 
(Sacks 1999). “There are standardized tests for wine tasters, baseball umpires, 
plumbers, ballroom dancing instructors, Bible scholars, and art collectors,” wrote 
Sacks (1999) in a book about the national obsession with the culture of testing. Yet 
standing behind the illusion “held by most employers that such exams can sort the 
capable from the incapable” it is the testing industry that sells the mythology one 
can measure a person’s job readiness or work-related performance abilities. There 
are billions of dollars in revenue to be accumulated from selling and administering 
educational tests, and these firms are positioned to work in concert with 
governments and educational reformers.  (Lakes, 2011). 
During this study it is observed that the rischest literature and field researches 
on certification exist in the U.S.A. Therefore functioning of the industry is 
analysed here by giving examples mainly from the U.S.A. and little from Europe. 
In the U.S.A the standardized tests are based upon levels of mastery in the three 
foundational areas of applied math, reading for information, and locating 
information, cognitive skills considered by businesses as essential for a well-
qualified workforce. Each test battery, timed and proctored, is about fifty-five 
minutes long, available in paper and pencil or computerized versions, and consists 
of over thirty multiple-choice questions per exam covering the reading of textual 
materials such as memos and letters, or bulletins and policies; the calculating of 
mathematical formulas and multiple steps in conversions over work-related 
problems; and the locating of information on graphical images and figures, tables 
and charts, or floor plans and diagrams. In the U.S. the ACT charges $17.00 per 
exam, but costs are subsidized by the states for clients in employment and training 
programs. First introduced in the USA in 2006, the National Career Readiness 
Certificate is used in 37 states for assessing individual work-ready skill levels, 
producing over 691,000 registered certificates. The certificates tell employers what 
to expect in terms of on-the-job proficiencies and ability and willingness to 
perform new jobs—making transparent a uniform system for recognizing the skills 
and qualifications held by potential applicants  (Lakes, 2011).  
Several authors analyse the positioning of beneficiaries who are parts of 
certification programmes by stating that if training is useful for employers and 
unemployed persons why government money should be spent on it. Why could it 
not be arranged by the employers and the unemployed persons involved? If the 
training is beneficial to the employer or the unemployed person, or to both, why 
would they not want to invest in training themselves? There is a number of reasons. 
First, the return of training to the unemployed person is uncertain. He has no 
guarantee of finding a job and even if he does, the initial pay may be relatively low. 
 JEPE, 2(1), G. Yılmaz, p.92-114. 
105 
 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
If he is risk-averse, he might not engage in training, even if there is a positive 
expected return on training (Kodde, 1987; Ritzen, 1989 cited by Baaijens, 
Cluitmans, Gelderblom, Huitema and Waterreus, 1998: 72). Another difficulty is 
that training costs are high, implying that most people would have to borrow the 
money. However, it is hard to imagine that banks would lend money to an 
unemployed person. The costs would even enormously increase if the unemployed 
person would face the risk of loosing a benefit because of training participation. 
When following training, unemployment benefit receivers are expected to be 
available for a job. Following training - especially in day-time - carries the danger 
of loosing the unemployment benefit, because the availability for a job is doubted. 
This is a bottleneck for private initiatives in the field of training for the 
unemployed (Baaijens, et al., 1998: 73).  
Spring points out (1998) that also in Europe a uniform credential already 
established and widely accepted is the Europass, a European Union (EU) personal 
skills card used by the member states to signify employability. It is a compact 
document or curriculum vitae that records prior work histories and language 
proficiencies as well as vocational certificates, higher education qualifications, and 
transnational learning or training experiences. The credential was initiated by EU 
public policymakers who spoke of closer alliances with business and training 
organizations, for they understood the real need for workforce improvements, with 
demands for up-skilling in computer and information technologies, and for workers 
who engendered lifelong learning (Lakes, 2011). Similarly also in Netherlands 
employees may follow job-related training outside working-hours on their own 
expenses (Baaijens, et al., 1998: 38). 
 
7. Beneficiaries’ Criticisms Against Certification 
Certification exams and certification requirements are typically designed by a 
vendor. For example, Microsoft, Cisco, and Novell each have their own 
certification programs and tests. Some of them are more general; others are very 
product- or subjectoriented. Each vendor typically provides several certificates that 
may be obtained if one has successfully passed a certain number of exams. For 
example, to obtain Microsoft Certified Professional certificate, one needs to pass a 
single test; while to become a Microsoft Certified Systems Engineer (MCSE), one 
is required to pass five core exams (four operating system exams and one design 
exam), plus two elective exams. In many cases certificates have to be renewed after 
two or three years. There are also some certification programs that are considered 
“vendor-neutral.” They have been designed by a third party or a group rather than a 
single vendor (Vakhitova & Bollinger, 2011).  
Also because certifications are vendor-oriented, they do not prepare technical 
staffs for the real World that at the same time no one is overseeing the whole 
process. No environment is made up of just Microsoft, or UNIX, or Novell, or 
Linux or etc. The real-world enterprise is made up of at least two platforms, and 
tens if not hundreds of applications from a host of vendors. The real world is a 
fully integrated environment. Moreover IT certifications have been devalued since 
their heyday in the mid- to late 1990s. The reason for the devaluation is brain 
dumps let service receivers get all the questions on a live exam. They can then pass 
the exam without knowing the technology. People earn the certification without 
training and without experience, and advertise themselves as experts. This makes 
everyone look bad and devalues the certification process. There are some vendors, 
such as Microsoft and Cisco, which are trying to improve the value of the testing 
experience by incorporating simulations. But the result of these efforts just like as a 
band-aid. Many knowledge-based cognitive exams are poorly written, poorly 
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edited, not real-world oriented, and not in tune with the needs of the industry 
(Wyrostek, 2008). 
While employability exams are favored by employers in sizing-up individuals 
for their firms,  
“test scores are decidedly poor predictors of one’s job performance or career 
achievement” (Sacks 1999). Critics question the validity and reliability of these 
assessments, the veracity of measurements on a battery of timed, work-based 
aptitudes that actually determine occupational success in the real world. Moss and 
Tilley (2001) said that judging skills is problematical due to subjectivity factors 
and “cannot be measured with precision”—even though psychometricians claim 
talented workers can be spotted and marked. And, second, due to situational factors 
in the workplace, skills are “profoundly dependent on context” and employers add 
their own “attitudes to the mix”. That is, human resource personnel who require 
face-to face interviews with potential job candidates in the selection process bring 
their own biases into play. Gender bias also plays-out in the arena of employability 
testing. Castellano (1997) remarked that “standardized tests do not predict future 
performance so much as they assess applicants’ exposure to a certain set of 
experiences and their ability to display it in testing situations”. In her study of an 
apprenticeship program for women preparing to work in the trades, testing bias 
appeared in question sets on technical literacy, such as mechanical reasoning and 
spatial relations. Females might not have prior exposure to using tools and hands-
on projects either at home or in grade school industrial arts classes that impact their 
abilities to master the timed, employment exams. And standardized testing 
adversely impacts the educational prospects of working-class kids, those most 
likely to score poorly are the ones who face a heightened regime of testing and test 
preparation academic curriculum once available to all now are limited to well-
heeled school districts (Lakes, 2011). 
Certification examinations are developed by private organizations and are not 
subject to the same level of legal scrutiny as that of a licensure examination. 
Certification organizations, being accountable only to themselves, are free to 
establish criteria in the interest of their members. They are not accountable to the 
public. The title used by an individual after successful completion of a certification 
examination does not carry any type of legal status. It does not embellish one’s 
licensure or procure additional rights. The public can rightfully assume that the use 
of certified professionals will increase the probability of more proficient care. 
However, by virtue of a certification examination being private and voluntary, it 
cannot be used by state as a public protection mechanism. Since the certification is 
voluntary and private, there are no legal requirements that the individual must be 
certified to be practice. Registered professional licensure is a prerequisite for 
achieving certification. However, the distinction between certification and 
licensure becomes blurred when certification and licensure have overlapping roles, 
-especially if there is not any national examination for licensure- as in the case of 
advanced practice nursing (Chornic, 2008). In addition to above cited concerns the 
process is voluntary and accreditation standards may vary even if certification 
programs become accredited. Certifying organizations may overlap in types of 
certifications offered but differ in standards, eligibility requirements, and 
examinations (Kendall-Gallagher and Blegen,2009). 
 
8. Turkish Case 
As it is stated in introduction the point of departure of this study is that the 
increased pressures on occupational chambers, especially TMMOB- Union of 
Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects and its affiliates to act as private 
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testing&certification firms in the market. Although certification industry does not 
limit itself only with technical staffs and covers entire working class, this study 
choose the umbrella organization of the chambers of engineers and architectures as 
an example. TMOOB was established in 1954 by the Law 7303 and the Decree-
Laws 66 and 85 amending of the Law 6235. It is a corporate body and a 
professional organization defined in the form of a public institution as stated in the 
Article 135 of the Constitution. At the establishment stage, TMMOB who defines 
itself as a professional democratic mass organizations had 10 Chambers and 8.000 
members. However, as of December 31, 2014, the number of Chambers has 
increased to 24, while the number of members reached 467.344 (TMMOB, 2015).  
The question of why occupational chambers are under significant pressure today 
to commercialize their training activities which have been given as free of charge 
for decades must be seeked in changed conditions of capital accumulation in 
Turkey. Indeed in the past, this special workforce numerically were too few 
comparing today that they had to be equipped with untouchable privilages. At the 
same time engineers and architects were mainly employed by Public Economic 
Enterprises especially between 1960 and 1990 that only few per cent of TMMOB 
members were working in private sector meaning that they did not produce surplus 
value. Just like how it happened in the rest of world following capitalist depression 
in 1970s, Professional employees in Turkey also faced with consecutive losses of 
rights that while unemployment among technical cadres was not the case in the 
past, today there are thousands of engineers and architects who are seeking jobs. 
Regarding the privilages generated from being members of TMMOB, it must be 
noted that today most of engineers have been working in private enterprises as 
totally deprived from these privilages.     
Under these highly precarious conditions beside many other layers of working 
class technical staffs have also been offered further trainings, exams, testing and 
certifications to improve their skills in order to find job. Although it has been 
presented as a way of finding job, this is not a job guarantee that also the staffs 
with certificates mostly fail to get a job in the final.   These programmes usually 
take three or four months and service receivers must pay the costs of courses by 
their own. Certification and testing procedures emerged as a life ring also for 
Turkish Government that staffs who have been taking these courses are not counted 
as jobless during these periods even if they have been seeking jobs. Thus, Turkish 
Government is enable today to display unemployment figures less than actual 
figures thanks to the certification mechanisms.  
Debates inside TMMOB affiliate chambers on whether they should support 
ongoing trends of commercial certfying process for their members show that there 
are conflicted positions in both within each chamber but also between different 
chambers. Nevertheless by moving from the fact that only The Chamber of 
Mechanical Engineers accepted to be accredited by TÜRKAK as of February 2015 
we may conclude that opponent chambers still represent majority in TMMOB at 
least for now. Below statement made by young engineers in the fourth convention 
of student members of EMO, The Chamber of Electrical Engineers affiliated in 
TMMOB may give an idea why opponents are against commercial practices in 
general and private certification in particular: 
“The new needs of capitalist class are flexibility, replaceability and multi-
functionality. Especially in the countries like Turkey international capital is 
required laborers who are able to accomodate new technologies, to be 
employed in different fields of job when necessarry, having job skills based 
on work experience rather than qualifications gained in schools and ready to 
work under most flexible forms. Accordingly, course credits in higher 
education have been lessened and university education has been transformed 
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to highly simple processes that students can get only a very general formation 
which enables them only to use the limited knowledge they get in the 
university education.  Thus students are only given a very general skill in 
specific occupation rather than having a holistic view, possesing entire 
knowledge of that occupation or doing scientific researches. They are asked 
to be certified by private agencies to fulfill their occupational deficiencies 
when they make job applications.  By this way, private courses and 
certification have been pervading while scientific characteristics of higher 
education are increasingly disappeared. Consequently engineers and technical 
staffs have to prove by submitting their certificates that they have enough 
skills to perform specific jobs and/or they must show that they are ready to 
work in any unrelated parts of job rather than being professionals who knows 
entire details of their occupation, able to produce new ideas related with their 
jobs and enable to develop projects. Following growing up of certification 
industry hiring and firing of engineers will be much easier for firms” 
(Kalaycı & Aras, 2007).  
Adversely to the position of engineers and their chambers, private sector defines 
this process as a conformity assessment program that it means skills, competency 
and experiences of a candidate is evaluated according to objective criterions by 
comparing needed requirements which are determined by standards. Then if the 
result of the evaluation is enough level, the candidate can have the personnel 
certification which it proves the candidate has enough skills, competency and 
experience in the related subject: 
“People who graduated from the education program have been increasing day 
by day. However personal qualification can’t meet needs of the industrial 
area depending on changing evolutions which is requested by current 
economy under the competitive conditions. As a result, it brings financial 
burden generated from staff circulation in the companies and causes 
decreasing of the competitive quality. The aim of “The Evaluation 
Convenience” and “The Personal Certification”  programs of TQNet for 
individual orientated to improve strictly required personal competency which 
will be met the current specific needs and to progress to the security of public 
and environment.”(TQNet Homepage, 2015)  
Also Turkish MYK, the Institution for Professional Competences states that 
private sector must be motivated to establish centers for testing and certifying in 
order to increase employment of staffs proper to the nature of business, to 
guarantee higher productivity and quality, to reduce the risk of loosing time and 
Money, to increase competition power of business, to contribute workers’ mobility 
in international markets and to set the stage for finding job of unemployees (MYK, 
2015). 
 
Table 1. Estimated Certification as of the end of 2015 
City Population Certifying 
Firms 
Estimated 
Number of 
Certificates 
İstanbul 12.915.158 3.200 8.850 
Ankara   4.650.802 1.500 3.198 
İzmir    3.868.305    800 2.660 
Bursa   2.550.645    400 1.265 
Adana   2.062.226    170 1.413 
Konya   1.992.675    550 1.370 
Antalya   1.919.719    680 1.111 
G.Antep   1.653.670      70 1.137 
Kocaeli    1.522.408    240    881 
Diyarbakır   1.515.011      90    577 
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Samsun 
Kayseri 
Balıkesir 
Van 
Denizli                   
Sakarya 
Erzurum 
Trabzon 
Eskişehir 
Malatya 
  1.250.076 
  1.205.872 
  1.140.085 
  1.022.310 
926.362 
     861.570 
     774.207 
     765.127 
     755.427 
     736.884 
   170 
   140 
   170 
     60 
   150 
   120 
     60 
     80 
   120 
   120 
   620 
   529 
   513 
   507 
   537 
   592 
   532 
   526 
   519 
   507 
Source: TÜBIDER VOC-Test Center  
 
As it can be seen in above given table the estimated number of private testing 
and certifying firms in Turkey is nearly 9 thousands as of 2014, despite legislative 
steps were taken in 2006, only eight years ago.  
In Turkey the NDT-Non Destructive Testing activities were started in 60's. 
However, these activities were localized, and realized by short seminars especially 
on the testing of weld seams. The first systematic and long-term program on NDT 
training in Turkey was initiated by the establishment of NDT Committee (NDTC) 
of the Chamber of Metallurgical Engineers in Ankara in 1987. In July 1988, based 
on the project agreement between Turkish and German governments, NDTC and 
Middle East Technical University (METU-Ankara) started to implement a training, 
qualification and certification program with the active participation of German 
NDT Society (DGZfP-Berlin) and German Federal Institute for Materials Research 
and Testing (BAM-Berlin). In the frame of the same project, the Welding 
Technology and NDT Centre was established in the premises of METU. A group 
of engineers from the METU and various industrial firms were trained and certified 
in several NDT methods to level-3 in Germany between the years 1989 and 1992. 
With participation of these groups, the NDTC has prepared an activity plan 
consisting of the regular programs for training, qualification and certification for 
NDT personal in Turkish firms, and then establishing the Turkish NDT Society. 
The working groups of training, qualification and certification, technical rules, and 
industrial relations were established in 1992. After July 1993, the system of the 
training and the qualification exams was adopted to EN 473. Parallel to the 
improvements in the related international standards, an independent certification 
body, named as "NDT-Personnel Certification Centre" was established in 1996. 
Starting from this date, the NDT training and qualification-certification activities 
have being carried out independently (www.ndt.net 2015). 
Regarding with international aspect it must be reminded that Turkey is member 
of a Customs Union with the EU since 1995 and as a candidate country it must 
align its national quality infrastructure with the European one. Beside many other 
factors which accelerate integration of Turkey in economic transformations around 
the World, it has to complete the establishment of the so-called quality 
infrastructure, a generic term encompassing the operators and operation of 
standardization, testing, certification, inspection, accreditation and metrology as 
well. Furthermore it is important to create confidence on an international level in 
the testing, inspection and certification bodies in Turkey and to create reliability in 
the tests they perform and in the certificates they issue. After the formation of the 
customs union in 1995, private conformity assessment bodies started to invest in 
Turkey in order to provide international certificates and markigs such as the ISO 
9000 series and CE marking for Turkish producers. The Turkish Accreditation 
Agency (TURKAK), founded in 1999 and commenced accepting accreditation 
applications for conformity assesment bodies in 2001. Accreditation is not 
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compulsory for notified bodies, but public authorities request –as emphasized by 
the European Commission- that candidate notified bodies comply with EN ISO 
45000 standards. These authorities work in cooperation with TURKAK to assess 
the capacity of the notified bodies, or accept those are to be notified to the 
European Commission. In particular, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of 
Public Works and Settlements, the Undersecretariat for Maritime Affairs and the 
Telecommunications Authority have established coopration protocols with 
TURKAK in this context. In 2002, TURKAK became a full member of the 
European Co-operation for Accreditation (EA). However becoming a member of 
an international organization is not sufficient to achive international recognition of 
accreditation certificates, as an accreditation body must also be a signatory to 
specific multilateral agreements (MLAs) with other accreditation bodies. In 
Turkey, marking and certification parallel to the EU system were implemented 
only in the automative sector till 2010, which was subject to the old approach 
directives. In addition Turkey suffered for a long time from a lack of certification 
bodies. Although Turkey opened up the certification, testing and calibration market 
to other actors, Turkish firms were reluctant to enter the market for conformity 
assesment bodies as long as uncertainities prevailed regarding the acceptance of 
notified bodies of the European Commission. In April 2006, TURKAK signed four 
out of seven MLAs with EA members. These MLAs cover the areas of test 
laboratories, cabibration laboratories, quality systems management, certification 
bodies and inspection bodies. Hence, since April 2006, certificates issued by all 
test, calibration, quality systems management and inspection bodies accredited by 
TURKAK are recognized within the EU. With the signing of the remaining three 
MLAs in 2008 TURKAK’s full international recognition has been completed. 
These three MLAs are those for product certification, personnel certification and 
environmental management systems certification  (Togan, 2010: 64-69). 
Another national body, the MYK- Institution on Vocational Quality Assesment 
was founded on 21st September 2006. The main objective of MYK is to study for 
the establishment of a National Vocational Qualification System based on a 
functional link between the quality of work life demands. MYK believes that this 
system will allow it to train the skilled workforce needed to compete in the global 
economy Turkey. It is underlined that one of the strengths of this system is to 
accept the concept of lifelong learning. In this context, MYK aims certfying those 
who acquire qualifications on the job, to provide vertical and horizontal job 
transfers between occupations and sectors, to prepare laborers for more flexible 
works by enabling them to reflect new developments emerged in their occupations 
to their professions via certification coursesn(www.myk.gov.tr, downloaded in 
February 2015). 
Although the market for certification services in Turkey shows a reasonable 
number of suppliers, the competence of some has been questioned and their 
practices may be anticompetitive. Of the estimated 82 certification bodies in 
Turkey, only 19 were accredited by the national accreditation body, TÜRKAK in 
2002. Again, as of March 2002, up to 700, or 18 percent of certificates in Turkey 
were delivered by nonaccredited bodies (Guasch, et al., 2007: 241-242). As of 
February 2015, the number of accredited certification firms have been reached to 
57 (TÜRKAK, 2015).  Moreover, some local stakeholders, both national and 
foreign, question the business ethics of some of the smaller certification bodies 
active in the Turkish market, some of them subsidiaries of European bodies 
accredited in their home countries as follows :  
“They appear to be performing poor audits and granting certificates quickly 
and cheaply, and they may not be adequately monitored by foreign 
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accreditation bodies. Many of the clients of these certification bodies appear 
to be services companies seeking to satisfy certification requirements for 
government procurement purposes. It is difficult for certification bodies 
accredited by TÜRKAK or by other reliable foreign accreditation bodies to 
compete under these circumstances. Until now, Turkish firms have had to use 
the services of the subsidiaries of organizations notified in other European 
countries. Two European subsidiaries share most of this market for CE 
marking. The presence of domestic notified bodies in Turkey would increase 
competition and expand the market to other parts of the country (Guasch, et 
al., 2007: 241-242)”.  
 
9. Conclusion 
In the study it is aimed to show different perspectives on licensure and private 
certification in general and also to give a brief information on the state of Turkey in 
particular. It is apparent that ongoing enlargement of private certification industry 
rise upon three basic reasons, allegedly, insufficiences in higher education, 
restrictive nature of licensure and qualifications required by new technologies. 
Although these excuses seem quite satisfactory for the very beginning of 
internationalization of productive capital in 1970s and 1980s, study manifests that 
processes of private certification passed much beyond of these excuses today. 
Indeed sector alone represents a new field for accumulation of capital. We may 
well conclude that this accumulation is carried out via two layers of working 
classes: masses who are obliged to be certified and waged laborers who work in 
certification industry in order to improve skills of those who are in need to be 
certified. Since staffs and professionals feel that they need to get certificates mostly 
when they are seeking job and also because they have to pay for these courses by 
their own, all tution fees imply reductions in future wages. Since the literature 
focusing on the numbers, wages and working conditions of trainers hired by 
certification firms is virtually non exist study suggests further researches especially 
on waged trainers working in private certification firms.   
Regarding Turkish case, this study seems to become first especially for critical 
writings that private certifying appears as a topic with numberless aspects to be 
searched. Although ongoing debates have been stuck in a dilemma of accredited 
and non-accredited firms none of these two cases are exempt from existing 
exploitation in certification industry. Under the propaganda jointly run by state 
authority and private sector, technical staffs are in difficulty to find their ways. 
Both actors the state and certification industry define this process as a conformity 
assessment program that it means skills, competency and experiences of a 
candidate is evaluated according to the objective criterions by comparing needed 
requirements which are determined by standards. Under these circumstances of 
uncertainities and manipulations in Turkey further critical researches become an 
unavoidable and unpostponable task for critical thinkers.        
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